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◗◗ Alter ego – a device that attributes the acts of important managers to the company 
itself, so that the company may be sued for compensation or convicted of crimes.
◗◗ Community interest company (CIC) – this type of company was created by the 
Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004. It is a form of 
company designed for community enterprises that are not charities.
◗◗ Corporate personality – the legal fiction that the company is an entity separate from 
the people actually involved in it.
◗◗ Lifting the veil – looking at the facts and disregarding the effect of the legal fiction that 
all companies are completely separate from their shareholders.
◗◗ Private company (Ltd) – this type of company may not advertise to the public in 
order to sell shares.
◗◗ Public company (PLC) – this type of company may offer shares to the public by 
advertisement.
 Starting a company
The first decision that must be made by those considering incorporation of a busi-
ness is the type of company that will be suitable.
 Unlimited and limited companies
 1.1.1(a) Unlimited companies
An unlimited company has the advantage of being a legal entity separate from its 
members but lacks the advantage that most people seek from incorporation, that 
is, the limited liability of the members. Thus, the members of an unlimited liability 
company will be held responsible for all of the debts of the company without 
limit. Unlimited companies therefore form only a small proportion of the total 
number of registered companies.
 1.1.1(b) Limited liability companies
‘The limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern times. 
Even steam and electricity are less important than the limited liability company,’ 
said Professor NM Butler, President of Columbia University (quoted by AL 
Diamond in Orhnial (ed.), Limited Liability and the Corporation (Law Society of 
Canada, 1982) at 42; see also Sealy, Company Law and Commercial Reality (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1984) at 1).
Why is the limited liability company so important? A huge proportion of the 
world’s wealth is generated by companies, and a company is most often used by 
people as a tool for running a commercial enterprise. Many of these businesses 




such a commercial undertaking prospers, the persons involved will wish to 
expand the undertaking, which will generally require an injection of money. This 
may be achieved by inviting more people to contribute to the capital sum that the 
business uses to fund its activities. The alternative is to raise a loan. The latter 
course has the disadvantage of being expensive, because the lender will charge 
interest. On the other hand, the option of inviting a large number of persons to be 
involved in a business may have considerable disadvantages. One is that they 
may disagree with each other as to how the business should best be run. They may 
even disagree with each other as to who should make the decisions about how the 
business is to be run. This is partially solved in a company by the necessity of hav-
ing a formal constitution (the memorandum and articles of association  – see 
Section 1.2.2), which sets out the voting and other rights of all the members (share-
holders) of a company.
Another disadvantage of expansion of a business is that as the amounts dealt 
with increase, so too do the risks. The great advantage of the most widely used 
type of company is that its members enjoy ‘limited liability’. This means that if 
the company becomes unable to pay its debts, the members of that company will 
not have to contribute towards paying all the company’s debts out of their own 
private funds: they are liable to pay only the amount they have paid, or have 
promised to pay, for their shares. This means that contributors to the funds of 
businesses that are run on this limited liability basis may be easier to find. 
Limited liability is also said to encourage greater boldness and risk-taking 
within the business community, so that new avenues to increasing commerce are 
explored.
The advantage of limited liability may lead quite small businesses to use a com-
pany, although this may not be advantageous from a tax point of view and leads 
to a number of obligations to file accounts and so on, which create a considerable 
burden for a small concern. Furthermore, if a very small business wishes to raise 
a loan from a bank, the bank will normally require a personal guarantee from the 
people running the business. This means that the advantage of limited liability 
will, practically speaking, be lost.
 1.1.1(c) Corporate personality
A further disadvantage of attempting to run a business with a large number of 
people involved is that considerable difficulties may be experienced when some 
of those people die, wish to retire or simply leave the business. There may be 
great difficulties for a person dealing with the business in deciding precisely who 
is liable to pay him. In a shifting body of debtors, an outsider may experience 
extreme difficulty in determining which people were actually involved in the 
business at the time that is relevant to his claim against it. This difficulty is solved 
by the legal fiction of corporate personality. The idea is that the company is an 
entity separate from the people actually involved in running it. This fictional 
‘legal person’ owns the property of the business, owes the money that is due to 
business creditors and is unchanging even though the people involved in the 
business come and go. Corporate personality is discussed in further detail in 
Section 1.5.
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The UK company law rules were the subject of a Department of Trade and 
Industry review during 2001–02. Although it was publicised as a ‘fundamental 
review’ of company law, the changes that resulted were quite modest in substance. 
However, the Companies Act 2006 almost completely replaces the previous 
Companies Act 1985, so that many sections have been slightly changed in sub-
stance and bear a different number in the new Act. This is important, because 
some of the case law will refer to the previous Companies Act 1985 and readers 
will have to find the relevant section in the Companies Act 2006.
As we examine company law of the UK, it is useful to consider the purpose 
behind the various rules and whether they are sufficiently effective in achieving 
their purpose and also whether they justify the expense that is incurred by com-
panies to ensure that their operations stay within the complicated framework that 
has grown up.
 Public and private companies
The fundamental difference between public and private companies is that only 
public companies may invite the public to subscribe for shares. Section 755 of the 
Companies Act 2006 prohibits a private company from offering, allotting or agree-
ing to allot securities to the public or acting with a view to their being offered to 
the public. Section 756 defines ‘offer to the public’ as including an offer to any 
section of the public, however selected. However, it is not an offer to the public if 
it can properly be regarded, in all the circumstances, as:
 1. not being calculated to result, directly or indirectly, in securities of the company 
becoming available to persons other than those receiving the offer; or
 2. otherwise being a private concern of the person receiving it and the person 
making it.
In other words, the offeror and offeree must either be known to each other or be 
part of a close network of friends, family or acquaintances for the offer not to con-
stitute an ‘offer to the public’.
Public companies are therefore more suitable for inviting investment by large 
numbers of people. A private company is particularly suitable for running a busi-
ness in which a small number of people are involved. Professor Len Sealy describes 
the situation as follows:
During the nineteenth century (and indeed for a considerable period before that) the 
formation of almost all companies was followed immediately by an appeal to the public 
to participate in the new venture by joining as members and subscribing for ‘shares’ in 
the ‘joint stock’ … The main reason for ‘going public’ in this way was to raise funds in 
the large amounts necessary for the enterprises of the period – often massive operations 
which built a large proportion of the world’s railways, laid submarine cables, opened up 
trade to distant parts and provided the banking, insurance and other services to support 
such activities. The promoters would publish a ‘prospectus’, giving information about 
the undertaking and inviting subscriptions. This process is often referred to as a ‘flota-
tion’ of the company or, more accurately, of its securities. 
(Sealy, Cases and Materials in Company Law, 6th edn, Butterworths, 1996)
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As one might expect, the regulations governing public companies are more 
extensive than those governing private companies. In many areas, however, no 
distinction is made between the two types of company.
 Off-the-shelf companies
Ready-made companies may be acquired from enterprises that register a number 
of companies and hold them dormant until they are purchased by a customer. 
This may save time when a company is needed quickly for a particular enterprise. 
There used to be a potential problem in that the objects clause of such a company 
might not precisely cover the enterprise in question, with the result that such a 
company would be precluded from carrying on the desired business. Contracts 
made in pursuance of such an enterprise would be of no effect (see Chapter 4). 
However, many such companies will be formed in the future with the objects of a 
general commercial company and with unlimited powers on the basis of section 
31 of the Companies Act 2006.
 Community interest companies
Community Interest Companies (CICs) are limited companies with special 
additional features, created for the use of people who want to conduct a busi-
ness or other activity for the benefit of a community and not purely for private 
advantage. They were introduced by the Companies (Audit, Investigations and 
Community Enterprise) Act 2004. The fundamental idea was that this would 
provide a legal form for those considering creating a social enterprise. This is 
achieved by a ‘community interest test’ and an ‘asset lock’, which ensures that 
the CIC is established for community purposes and that the assets and profits 
are dedicated to these purposes. Registration of a company as a CIC has to be 
approved by the Regulator, who also has a continuing monitoring and enforce-
ment role.
Setting up a CIC is a big step because, once registered, the only ways of chang-
ing its form are:
 1. dissolving the company so that it ceases to exist altogether or
 2. converting the CIC to a charity and subjecting the company to the more oner-
ous regulatory regime of charity law.
This means that once a company is a CIC, it cannot become an ordinary 
company.
The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills regulates CICs. The basic 
idea is to have a limited liability company but for a special reason for the commu-
nity. CICs should have a flexible structure, including limited liability, the ability to 
tailor the management of the company and at some time provide a real benefit for 
the community. CICs are not focused on profit, and if the company is dissolved, 
the assets of the company should go to the community. Charity status for CICs is 
not appropriate because of the rigid structures of charity legislation. CICs can be 
1.1.3
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funded by individuals, shareholders or foundations, and some types of CICs can 
make profits and then pay dividends. However, there are restrictions on divi-
dends and assets, and the CIC Regulator can change the caps on dividends and 
assets.
The office of the Regulator of Community Interests Companies published its 
Operational Report 2011–2012, saying that CICs are now part of the social enter-
prise landscape: ‘We have CICs in every sector including the arts, education, envi-
ronment, health, industry and transport.’ On 10 December 2013, there were more 
than 8,000 CICs.
 Formation of a company
Section 7 of the Companies Act 2006 describes the method for forming a 
company:
A company is formed under this Act by one or more persons—
 (a) subscribing their names to a memorandum of association …, and
 (b) complying with the requirements of this Act as to registration …
If only it were that simple! That, of course, describes only the basic requirements 
for forming a company. Many and greater complications will arise when we look 
at how the company makes decisions and does business in the course of its active 
life.
 Financing a company
The first issue for a business is the way in which the business is to be financed. 
Limited liability companies have the advantage that the members’ liability to con-
tribute to the debts of the company has a fixed limit that is always clear. 
Traditionally, there were two ways of setting the limit: (i) by issuing shares or (ii) 
by taking guarantees from the members that they would contribute up to a fixed 
amount to the debts of the company when it was wound up or when it needed 
money in particular circumstances. The first type of company is a company lim-
ited by shares, the second is a company limited by guarantee. No new companies 
limited by guarantee and having a share capital to provide working money may 
be formed (Companies Act 2006, s 5). This means that a guarantee company 
formed in the future cannot have any contributions from guarantees. This form is 
therefore unsuitable for commercial enterprises, although the form has been 
extensively used to carry out semi-official functions, particularly in the sphere of 
regulation of the financial services market.
In a company limited by shares, the members know that they will never have to 
pay more into the company than the full purchase price of their shares. This need 
not necessarily be paid when they are first purchased. When some money is out-
standing on shares, the company may issue a ‘call’ for the remainder to be paid, 
but it can never demand more than the full price due to the company for a particu-




section 3(2) of the Companies Act 2006, if the liability of shareholders is limited to 
the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares held by them, the company is ‘limited by 
shares’. By section 3(3), if the liability is limited to such amount ‘as the members 
undertake to contribute to the assets of the company in the event of its being 
wound up’, it is a ‘company limited by guarantee’.
 1.2.1(a) Minimum capital requirements for a public company
A private company need have only a very small amount of capital. However, the 
European Community Second Directive set a minimum amount of capital for a 
public company. Section 763 of the Companies Act 2006 sets the minimum for UK 
companies at £50,000 or the euro equivalent and gives power to the Secretary of 
State to specify a different sum by statutory instrument. The company is not 
obliged to have received the full £50,000. However, by section 586, public compa-
nies must receive at least one-quarter of the nominal value of the shares. The 
amount of capital actually contributed could be as little as £12,500, although the 
company would have a right to make a ‘call’ on the shareholders demanding pay-
ment of the unpaid capital (that is, the outstanding £37,500).
By section 761 of the 2006 Act, it is a criminal offence committed by the public 
company, and any officer of it in default, to do business or to borrow money before 
the Registrar of Companies has issued a trading certificate to the effect that he is 
satisfied that the nominal value of the company’s allotted share capital is not less 
than the prescribed minimum and that he has received a statutory declaration, 
which must be signed by a director or secretary of the company and must:
 1. state that the nominal value of the company’s allotted share capital is not less 
than the authorised minimum;
 2.  specify the amount, or estimated amount, of the company’s preliminary 
expenses;
 3.  specify any amount or benefit paid or given, or intended to be paid or given, to 
any promoter of the company, and the consideration for the payment or benefit 
(see Chapter 4).
 Registration of a company
 1.2.2(a) The memorandum of association and the company constitution
It is essential that a company have a memorandum of association, which under 
section 8 of the Act is:
a memorandum stating that the subscribers—
 (a) wish to form a company under this Act, and
 (b)  agree to become members of the company and, in the case of a company that is 
to have a share capital, to take at least one share each.
However, the constitution of the company comprises the company’s articles of 
association and any resolutions made under Chapter 3 of the Act, which essentially 
1.2.2
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are ‘important’ resolutions passed by special majorities or by unanimous agree-
ment. It is important to note that a company must have articles of association, but 
if none is drafted or not all of the provisions of the ‘model articles’ are excluded, 
then those model articles apply by default. The model articles are the default com-
pany constitution for limited companies in the UK. Section 20 of Companies Act 
2006 clarifies that they form part of the company’s articles in the same manner and 
to the same extent as if articles in the form of those articles had been duly registered 
(for further detail on the articles of association, see Chapter 3).
The memorandum must be delivered to the Registrar of Companies together 
with an application for registration. Section 9 sets out the basic requirements that 
must be included in the application for registration. These are:
◗◗ the name of the company;
◗◗ whether the registered office is to be in England and Wales, in Wales, in Scotland 
or Northern Ireland;
◗◗ whether liability of the members of the company is to be limited and, if so, 
whether it is to be limited by shares or guarantee;
◗◗ whether it is to be a private or a public limited company.
The application must also contain a statement of proposed officers of the company 
(s 9(4)(c)).
 1.2.2(b) Name
The choice of a name for a company is of considerable importance and subject to 
a number of restrictions. With exceptions for companies of a charitable or ‘social’ 
nature, if the liability of members of the company is to be limited, the company 
name must end with ‘Limited’ (permitted abbreviation ‘Ltd’) if a private company 
and with ‘Public Limited Company’ (permitted abbreviation ‘PLC’ or ‘plc’) if a 
public company (or the Welsh equivalents – see further Section 1.2.2(d)).
By section 53 of the Companies Act 2006, a company may not be registered with 
a name which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, would constitute a criminal 
offence or be offensive, and the Secretary of State’s approval is required for the use 
of a name which would be likely to give the impression that the company is con-
nected with the government or any local authority or which includes any word or 
expression specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State (Companies Act 
2006, ss 54 and 55). The name must not be the same as any other kept in the index 
of company names held by the Registrar (Companies Act 2006, s 66).
By sections 77 to 81 of the Act, a company may change its name by special reso-
lution, by any other means provided for by its articles and by a resolution of its 
directors.
One further restriction on the selection of names is imposed by the rules against 
using a name so similar to the name used by an existing business as to be likely to 
mislead the public into confusing the two concerns (so-called passing off). Thus, 
in Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd [1982] Ch 119, 
the court granted an injunction restraining the defendants from using the word 
‘Exxon’ in their company’s name.
In Reckitt & Colman Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 All ER 873, Lord Oliver reaffirmed 
the test for passing off. The claimant in a passing-off action has to:
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establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies in 
the mind of the purchasing public by association with the identifying ‘get-up’ (whether 
it consists simply of a brand name or a trade description, or the individual features of 
labelling or packaging) under which his particular goods or services are offered to the 
public, such that the get-up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the 
[claimant’s] goods or services. Second, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the 
defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public 
to believe that goods or services offered by him are the goods or services of the [claim-
ant]. … Third, he must demonstrate that he suffers or … that he is likely to suffer damage 
by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the defendant’s misrepresentation that 
the source of the defendant’s goods or services is the same as the source of those offered 
by the [claimant].
Therefore, the three basic elements of passing off are reputation, misrepresenta-
tion and damage to goodwill.
In Asprey & Garrard Ltd v WRA (Guns) Ltd & Anor [2001] EWCA Civ 1499, the 
issue was the defence arising from the use of one’s own name in business. 
Although Mr Asprey was using his own name, that name could be associated with 
a different retail shop (a famous jeweller), causing confusion. The Court of Appeal 
stated that in this case the use of the name caused not only confusion but also 
deception, as the name had been used as a trade mark. Thus, it is evident that a 
person cannot carry on business in his own name if he is not honest and he causes 
deception. The principle is that a person’s using his own name in business cannot 
prevent a passing-off claim by a company already operating under the same or a 
very similar name.
 1.2.2(c) Share capital
By section 9(4) of the Companies Act 2006, in the case of a company limited by 
share capital, the application must state the amount of share capital with which 
the company proposes to be registered (further details in Chapter 5). This is known 
as its ‘authorised share capital’, ‘registered share capital’ or ‘nominal share capi-
tal’. It does not represent the amount actually contributed at the time when the 
company is formed, which may be only part of the share price.
 1.2.2(d) Private or public limited company
As we have seen, where a company is to be registered as a public company, this 
must be stated in the application for registration and the words ‘public limited 
company’ (or the abbreviation ‘PLC’ or ‘plc’) must appear at the end of its name 
unless it is Welsh or a CIC (Companies Act 2006, s 58). A private limited company 
must normally have a name ending in ‘Ltd’ unless it is a CIC, a charity or other-
wise exempted by sections 60, 61 or 62 of the Act.
 Incorporation
Section 9 of the Companies Act 2006 requires delivery of the memorandum, the 
application for registration and a statement of compliance to the Registrar of 
Companies for England and Wales, if the registered office is to be situated in either 
England or Wales, and for Scotland if the registered office is to be situated in 
Scotland. The statement must be signed by or on behalf of the subscribers to the 
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memorandum, and the intended address of the company’s registered office must 
be stated.
 Duty of the Registrar
Section 14 of the Companies Act 2006 provides that if the Registrar is satisfied that 
the requirements of the Act have been complied with, he must register the docu-
ments delivered to him. Under section 15, he must issue a certificate that the com-
pany is incorporated. Section 15(4) provides that the certificate of incorporation is 
conclusive evidence that the requirements of the Act have been met and the com-
pany is duly registered. Thus, the company’s existence as such is unchallengeable 
from the date of the issue of the certificate of incorporation.
By section 16 of the Act:
 (1) The registration of a company has the following effects as from the date of 
incorporation.
 (2)  The subscribers to the memorandum, together with such other persons as may 
from time to time become members of the company, are a body corporate by 
the name stated in the certificate of incorporation.
 (3)  That body corporate is capable of exercising all the functions of an incorpo-
rated company.
 (4)  The status and registered office of the company are as stated in, or in connec-
tion with, the application for registration.
 (5)  In the case of a company having a share capital, the subscribers to the memo-
randum become holders of the shares specified in the statement of capital and 
initial shareholdings.
 (6)  The persons named in the statement of proposed officers—
(a) as director, or
(b) as secretary or joint secretary of the company,
 are deemed to have been appointed to that office.
 Change of status from public to private company  
and vice versa
A change of status from private to public company is much more common than 
registration as a public company on initial incorporation. Part 7 of the Companies 
Act 2006 provides for this change of status from private to public and from public 
to private status. In both cases, the members of the company must pass a special 
resolution (a resolution passed by at least 75 per cent of the votes cast) to effect the 
change. In the case of a change from private to public, the Registrar of Companies 
must be provided with a statutory declaration that the minimum capital require-
ments for public companies have been satisfied (see Section 1.2.1(a)) and that the 




If the reverse change of status from public to private is undertaken, the mem-
bers may find that it is more difficult to sell their shares. There are safeguards in 
the Act aimed at protecting a minority who object to such a change of status. 
Under section 98 of the Companies Act 2006, the holders of 5 per cent or more of 
the nominal value of a public company’s shares, any class of the company’s issued 
share capital or 50 members may apply to the court for the cancellation of a special 
resolution to request re-registration as a private company. The court has an unfet-
tered discretion to cancel or approve the resolution on such terms as it thinks fit 
(Companies Act 2006, s 98(4) and (5)).
 Groups
The old definition of the parent–subsidiary relationship was to be found in section 
736 of the Companies Act 1985. That read:
 (1) For the purposes of this Act, a company is deemed to be a subsidiary of 
another if (but only if)—
(a) that other either—
(i) is a member of it and controls the composition of its board of 
directors, or
(ii) holds more than half in nominal value of its equity share capi-
tal, or
(b) the first-mentioned company is a subsidiary of any company which is 
that other’s subsidiary.
This definition caused two main difficulties. The first was that it concentrated on 
the number of shares held (the total of all of the shares together is known as the 
equity share capital). This ignores the fact that control is exercised through voting 
rights, which need have no relationship to the number of shares held.
The second difficulty lay with the reference to the control of the board of direc-
tors (s 736(1)(a)(i)). Under the original sections in the 1985 Act, a company was 
deemed to control the composition of the board of directors if it could appoint or 
remove the holders of all or a majority of the directorships. If one company could 
appoint less than a majority of the directors, but those it was able to appoint had 
extra voting rights so that they could outvote the other directors, then control of 
the board’s activities was effectively achieved, while the arrangement was still 
outside the scope of the section.
By these and other methods, it was possible to avoid the intended effect of the 
section, which was to treat a group of companies as a single business for various 
purposes, including accounting purposes. Because of this, the Companies Act 
1989 introduced new definitions of this relationship. These now appear in the 
Companies Act 2006, section 1159:
 (1) A company is a ‘subsidiary’ of another company, its ‘holding company’, if that 
other company—
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(a) holds a majority of the voting rights in it, or
(b) is a member of it and has the right to appoint or remove a majority of its 
board of directors, or
(c) is a member of it and controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with other 
shareholders or members, a majority of the voting rights in it, or if it is a 
subsidiary of a company that is itself a subsidiary of that other company.
 (2) A company is a ‘wholly owned subsidiary’ of another company if it has no 
members except that other and that other’s wholly owned subsidiaries or per-
sons acting on behalf of that other or its wholly owned subsidiaries.
The emphasis has shifted from ownership of shares to control of voting rights, 
which are further defined by the Act. This gives a more realistic picture of a group 
of companies. (Further details of company groups and multinational companies 
are to be found in Chapter 14.)
 Corporate personality
 Meaning of corporate personality
The essence of a company is that it has a legal personality distinct from the people 
who compose it. This means that even if the people running the company are con-
tinually changing, the company itself retains its identity, and the business need 
not be stopped and restarted with every change in the managers or members 
(shareholders) of the business. If the company is a limited liability company, not 
only is the money owned by the company regarded as wholly distinct from the 
money owned by those running the company but also the members of the com-
pany are not liable for the debts of the company (except where the law has made 
exceptions to this rule in order to prevent fraudulent or unfair practices by those 
in charge). Members may be called upon to pay only the full price of their shares. 
After that, a creditor must depend on the company’s money to satisfy his claim.
This limitation of the liability of the members has led to careful rules being 
drawn up to attempt to prevent a company from wasting its money (Chapter 7). It 
is one of the disadvantages of incorporation that a number of formal rules, 
designed to protect people doing business with companies, have to be complied 
with. A partnership that consists of people carrying on a business with a view to 
making profits needs comply with many fewer formalities. On the other hand, the 
members of an ordinary partnership are liable for all the debts incurred by the 
business they run. (It is possible now to form a limited liability partnership.) If 
large losses are made, partners in an ordinary partnership must contribute their 
own money to clear the debts of the business. In practice, this may be a distinction 
without a difference since, where small businesses are concerned, banks will not 
lend money to a company without first securing guarantees from those running 
the business, so that if the company cannot pay its debts, such debts will be met 
from the personal assets of those in charge.
The separate personality of a company creates a range of problems, because 
although the company is regarded as a person in law, it can function only through 




The law must regulate the relationships between a company and its creators and 
members or shareholders, as well as the relationship between a company and 
‘outsiders’ who do business with the company.
 The legal basis for the separate personality doctrine
The case of Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 is by no means the first case to depend 
on the separate legal personality of a company, but it is the most widely discussed 
in this context. Mr Salomon was a boot and shoe manufacturer who had been 
trading for over 30 years. He had a thriving business. He also had a large family 
to provide for. To enable the business to expand, he turned it into a limited liability 
company. As part of the purchase price, he took shares in the company and lent 
the company money in return for ‘debentures’, which are paid off preferentially in 
the event of liquidation (see Chapter 13). The company did not last very long. 
Almost immediately, there was a depression in the boot and shoe trade and a 
number of strikes. Mr Salomon tried to keep the company afloat by lending it 
more money and by transferring his debentures to a Mr Broderip for £5,000, which 
he handed over to the company on loan. However, liquidation was not long in 
coming. The sale of the company’s assets did not realise enough to pay the credi-
tors. The liquidator claimed that the debentures had been issued fraudulently and 
were therefore invalid. He also denied that the business had been validly trans-
ferred from Mr Salomon to the company. The grounds for both these claims were 
that the business had been overvalued at £39,000 instead of its true worth of 
around £10,000 and that the whole transfer to a limited company amounted to a 
scheme to defeat creditors.
The judge who heard the case first admitted that the transfer had been legally 
carried out and could not be upset. However, he suggested (Broderip v Salomon 
[1895] 2 Ch 323) that Mr Salomon had employed the company as an agent and that 
he was therefore bound to indemnify the agent. He said that the creditors of the 
company could have sued Mr Salomon despite the existence of the company to 
which the business had been legally transferred. In the Court of Appeal, Mr 
Salomon’s appeal was dismissed. However, the House of Lords took a different 
view. Lord MacNaughten said:
The company is at law a different person altogether from [those forming the company] 
and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was 
before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the 
company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the sub-
scribers as members liable, in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner 
provided by the Act … If the view of the learned judge were sound, it would follow that 
no common law partnership could register as a company limited by shares without 
remaining subject to unlimited liability.
Thus was established the complete separation between a company and those 
involved in its operation. As with many principles of English law, having estab-
lished first the principle, we then must then look at the problems caused by and 
the exceptions to that principle.
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 The fundamental importance of separate personality
The invention of the company as separate is vital, as it means that it is free to 
develop as an instrument of business shaped by both the people involved in its 
running and those regulating its existence. That different models of companies 
have come to exist is a direct result of the fact that the company’s separate person-
ality sets it apart from the individuals who are running it. Although many people 
believe that the shareholders of a company are the ‘owners’ of the company, in fact 
the shareholders are not the owners of the property of the company. The property 
of the company is vested in the company itself. The company is a legal fiction; it is 
a legal person. The shareholders have rights in the company but not ownership of 
the legal person, the company. The shareholders own shares and because of that 
the law and the constitution of the company regulate shareholders’ rights. 
Shareholders’ rights are limited by the law, although the articles and the memo-
randum (the company’s constitution – see Chapter 3) may allow shareholders less 
or more power when the documents founding the company are drafted. The back-
drops of the shareholders’ rights are the mandatory sections of company law.
In the UK, company law is a contractual model. This means that the sharehold-
ers in the company are the paramount stakeholders of the company, although the 
Companies Act 2006 has softened the hard contractual edge, allowing directors to 
consider other stakeholders’ interests. Other jurisdictions have other models. 
Those that have developed in different states say a great deal about the society in 
which they operate. Chapter 2 considers this concept, normally called corporate 
governance, in more detail.
 Problems caused by the personality doctrine and exceptions
The first ‘personality’ problem that may arise is that experienced by those seeking 
to form a company in order to carry on a business. While they are completing the 
formalities that will lead to registration of the company and the consequent gain 
of legal personality for the company, its creators may wish to sign contracts for the 
benefit of the company when it is formed. The difficulty is that the company does 
not exist as a legal person until registration and therefore cannot be party to any 
contract; neither may it employ agents to act on its behalf. The law on such ‘pre- 
incorporation contracts’ is explained in Chapter 4.
The second problem is the one under discussion in Salomon’s cases (Section 
1.5.2). A limited liability company can be a very powerful weapon in the hands of 
someone determined on fraud and on defeating a creditor’s rightful claims. Will 
the courts make no exceptions to the rule that a company is wholly separate from 
those who manage and control it? A survey of the case law shows that the courts 
do relax the strict principle of the separateness of the company from time to time. 
There is general agreement among those who have sought to analyse the relevant 
cases that the only principle that can be gleaned from the decisions is that the 
courts will look at the human reality behind the company if the interests of justice 
provide a compelling reason for doing so. This may sound like an excellent prin-
ciple, but when the huge variety of situations that are likely to arise is considered, 
such a vague notion makes it extremely difficult to predict what a court will do in 




have referred to it as ‘lifting’ or ‘piercing’ of the veil of incorporation. There are a 
number of cases, discussed in Section 1.5.6, which are clearly relevant to the sanc-
tity of the ‘veil’ of incorporation, but the whole of company law is riddled with 
examples of the validity of acts depending on the effect they will have on the 
members of a company. An example would be where the part of the constitution 
of a company known as the articles of association is changed; that change may be 
challenged unless it can be justified as being in good faith and for the benefit of the 
company as a whole. In order to determine the latter, the effect of the decision on 
the members of the company must be examined.
It is also said that the proper person to sue to redress a wrong done to the com-
pany is the company itself. However, there is an exception to this rule to prevent 
those in charge of the company causing damage to shareholders in a powerless 
minority, for example by taking the company’s property. The examples in Chapter 
10 clearly show the difficult task that those seeking to regulate a company have 
because of the doctrine of legal personality. The company must be given as much 
independence from its operators as possible; otherwise, it would always be sub-
ject to interference from a large number of (probably dissenting) voices and there-
fore be no less cumbersome than a partnership trying to operate by consensus. On 
the other hand, the law must always recognise the reality of the fact that the com-
pany can do nothing without human operators, and that those human operators 
may wish to hijack the company for their own ends, to the detriment of others 
who have money at stake.
 Statutory intervention
The personality of the company is recognised and ignored at will by the legisla-
ture. Those drafting legislation do not seem to respect the principle as being sac-
rosanct in itself and look merely to the end sought to be achieved by particular 
provisions. This is a highly practical approach. The courts might do well to admit 
that the only principle running through their decisions is justice in the individual 
case and thus adopt a similarly pragmatic approach.
 Lifting the veil
The separate personality of the company can have some unexpected and some-
times unwelcome effects. In Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd v Fitzgerald 
[1995] 1 BCLC 352, the defendant was a sole director of a company. Despite this, 
he was obliged to make disclosure of a personal interest in a resolution that he 
passed purporting to terminate his contract of employment, although the court 
held that ‘it may be that the declaration does not have to be out loud’. Although 
this sounds strange, it emphasises that the contract was one between the director 
and the company, so that in his capacity as an official acting in the interests of the 
company, the director must remind himself of his personal interest before deter-
mining a course of action. In Macaura v Northern Assurance Co [1925] AC 619, the 
court refused to ignore the separateness of the company and ‘lift the veil’, despite 
the fact that the consequence of so doing was to deny a remedy to someone whose 
personal fortune had gone up in smoke. Mr Macaura had sold the whole of the 
timber on his estate to a company. He owned almost all of the shares in the 
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company and the company owed him a great deal of money. Mr Macaura then 
took out an insurance policy on the timber in his own name. When almost all the 
timber was later destroyed by fire, he claimed under the insurance policy. The 
House of Lords held that he could not do so. He no longer had any legal interest 
in the timber and so fell afoul of the rule that an insurance policy cannot normally 
be taken out by someone who has no interest in what is insured.
Sometimes, other rules of law may be used to mitigate the effects of the strict 
application of the doctrine. This was done in Harrods v Lemon [1931] 2 KB 157. The 
estate agent division of Harrods was acting as agent in the sale of the defendant’s 
house. A purchaser was introduced and subsequently instructed surveyors to 
examine the house. The surveyors who were instructed were from Harrods’ sur-
veyors’ department. The survey disclosed defects, as a result of which a reduced 
price was negotiated. The defendant had been informed prior to this of the fact 
that Harrods were acting on both sides of the sale. This would normally be a 
breach of the agency contract between the estate agent department and the defen-
dant. The defendant, however, agreed to Harrods continuing to act for her. The 
two departments of Harrods were in fact completely separate. The judge (Avory J) 
agreed that there had been a technical breach of the agency contract between 
Harrods and the defendant. Although the two departments were completely sep-
arate, the company in fact was one single person in the eyes of the law. However, 
he also insisted that the defendant should pay Harrods, despite the breach, as she 
had agreed to their continuing to act despite having full knowledge of the breach.
The following cases provide a prime example of the way the courts will disre-
gard the separate personality of the company if that will achieve a just result, but 
will equally keep the veil of personality firmly in place where that will benefit 
someone for whom the court feels sympathy. In Malyon v Plummer [1963] 2 All ER 
344, a husband and wife had full control of a company. The husband was killed by 
the defendant in a car accident and the widow was unable to continue the busi-
ness of the company. An insurance policy had been taken out on the man’s life and 
£2,000 was paid to the company on his death. The shares of the company were 
therefore more valuable than they had been prior to his death. The plaintiff 
(widow) had received an inflated salary from the company prior to her husband’s 
death. The court had to assess the future financial situation of the widow in order 
to set the amount of damages payable to her. It was decided that the excess of the 
plaintiff’s salary over the market value of her services was a benefit derived from 
the plaintiff’s relationship with her husband. It was therefore a benefit lost by his 
death and only the market value of her services should be taken into account in 
assessing her future position. This ignores the fact that she was employed by a 
company that should, in accordance with Salomon’s case, have been regarded as 
an entity completely separate from both husband and wife. It did mean, however, 
that the widow got more because the compensation was assessed in a way that 
included the inflated wage rate. The wage rate should have been assessed by the 
company, not by the husband, because the company should have been completely 
separate. Similarly, the court held that the insurance money was money that 
should be regarded as having been paid to the wife as a result of the death of the 
husband. The shares owned by the wife therefore should be valued at the lower 
value before the £2,000 was paid.
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It is very difficult to see a distinction in principle between Malyon v Plummer, 
where the veil was not just pierced but torn to shreds, and Lee v Lee’s Air Farming 
[1916] AC 12, where the emphasis was laid heavily on the separate legal personal-
ity of the company. In this case, the widow would have lost everything if the 
Malyon v Plummer approach had been adopted. In Lee, the appellant’s husband 
was the sole governing director and controlling shareholder of a company. He 
held all but one of the shares in the company. He flew an aircraft for the company, 
which had taken out an insurance policy that would entitle his widow to damages 
if, when he died, he was a ‘worker’ for the company. He was killed in a flying 
accident. It was held that the widow was entitled to compensation. Lee’s position 
as sole governing director did not make it impossible for him to be a servant of the 
company in the capacity of chief pilot, because he and the company were separate 
and distinct legal entities that could enter and had entered into a valid contractual 
relationship. The reasoning in Lee was followed in Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry v Bottrill [1999] BCC 177, where the Court of Appeal affirmed that a con-
trolling shareholder could also be an employee of the company for the purposes 
of claiming under the Employment Rights Act 1996.
The approach in Lee was also followed in Tunstall v Steigman [1962] QB 593. 
There, a landlord was unable to terminate a tenancy on the ground that he was 
going to carry on a business on the premises because the business was to be car-
ried on by a limited company. This was despite the fact that the landlord held all 
the shares in the company except for two, which were held by her nominees and 
of which she had sole control. The result in this case would be different if it was 
decided now, because section 6 of the Law of Property Act 1969 provides that 
where a landlord has a controlling interest in a company, any business to be car-
ried on by the company shall be treated for the purposes of section 30 of the 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 as a business carried on by him. The case remains 
useful, however, as an illustration of the way in which the courts have approached 
the question of corporate personality.
The corporate veil remained firmly in place in Williams v Natural Life Health 
Foods Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 577, where the House of Lords held that a managing 
director was not liable for negligent advice given by the company. Liability would 
arise only where personal responsibility for the advice, based on objective factors, 
had been assumed and there had been reliance on the assumption of responsibil-
ity. This had not been established, despite the fact that the director had played a 
significant part behind the scenes in negotiations leading up to the grant of a fran-
chise that the plaintiff purchased on the faith of financial projections furnished by 
someone introduced by the director and misrepresented as having relevant exper-
tise. A brochure issued by the director’s company had placed particular emphasis 
on the personal expertise and experience of the director. There were, however, no 
personal dealings between the managing director and the plaintiff.
 Fraud
The ability to hide behind the corporate veil could be a powerful weapon in the 
hands of those with fraudulent tendencies. The courts have therefore always 
reserved the right to ignore a company that is formed or used merely to perpetrate 
a dishonest scheme. In Salomon’s cases, both the Court of Appeal and the judge at 
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the first instance thought that they had before them just such a case of fraud. Since 
there was no evidence of dishonest intent in that case, it seems that these courts 
were using ‘fraud’ in a very wide sense. Indeed, they seem to have regarded the 
formation of the company so that the business could henceforth be carried on with 
limited liability as sufficient evidence of ‘fraud’. To take such a wide view would 
defeat the whole notion of the separate existence of the company and make it 
impossible for small private companies to function in any way differently from 
partnerships. The importance of the decision in Salomon in the House of Lords is 
clear. A mere wish to avail oneself of the benefits of limited liability is not of itself 
to be regarded as fraudulent.
A different view was taken of the conduct in Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442. 
In that case, the first defendant agreed to sell land to the plaintiffs. When he later 
wished to avoid the sale, he formed a company and transferred the land to it. The 
court held that the company was a ‘cloak’ for the first defendant and that he had 
the power to make the company do as he wished, and therefore the court would 
order the transfer of land to the plaintiff. In Trustor AB v Smallbone [2001] 1 WLR 
1177, the defendant, the managing director of Trustor AB, transferred funds from 
the account of Trustor AB to another company, Introcom Ltd, incorporated in 
Gibraltar, which was owned and controlled by him via a Liechtenstein trust. The 
board of directors did not authorise such a transaction. A part of these funds had 
found its way, via Introcom, to the defendant personally. The Court stated that:
Introcom is liable, as constructive trustee, to account for and repay to Trustor the Trustor 
moneys that were paid to it … Introcom was the creature of the defendant. He owned 
and controlled Introcom. The payments out by Introcom of Trustor money were pay-
ments made with the knowing assistance of him … the defendant would be liable jointly 
and severally with Introcom for the repayment of that money with interest thereon. The 
defendant’s joint and several liability would not be confined to the part that he person-
ally received … the defendant is, in my view, clearly liable, jointly and severally with 
Introcom, for the whole of the sums for which Introcom is accountable.
The defendant was therefore found personally liable to return the funds in ques-
tion on the basis that Introcom functioned as a façade used by him principally to 
misappropriate Trustor’s funds. He tried to hide behind the corporate veil to 
escape his obligation to return the misappropriated funds, but the court held him 
personally liable.
Similarly, in Gilford Motor Co v Horne [1933] Ch 935, the court refused to allow 
the defendant to avoid an agreement that he would not compete with former 
employers. He had attempted to do so by competing with them in the guise of a 
limited company. Even clearer cases were Re Darby [1911] 1 KB 95 and Re H [1996] 
2 BCLC 500. In Re Darby, the corporation was simply a device whereby a fraudu-
lent prospectus was issued and the directors of the company pocketed the public’s 
money. The directors were prosecuted for fraud and convicted. The court held 
that the directors were liable to repay all the money that had been received by 
them via the company. In Re H and Others (restraint order: realisable property) [1996] 
2 BCLC 500, two family companies had been used to defraud the Revenue. The 





1.1 There are several types of company. The most common is a limited company, the liability 
of the members being limited to the amount they have previously agreed. There are some 
unlimited companies where members are liable to pay the whole of the debts of the 
company.
◗◗ Companies may have a share capital or be limited by guarantee. In the former case, 
members buy shares. In the latter case, members agree to contribute to the debts of the 
company up to a certain amount.
◗◗ Companies may be public companies (PLCs) or private companies (normally having 
‘Ltd’ after their names). Only public companies can offer shares to the public. Public 
companies are subject to more regulations than private companies; their shares are 
traded on a recognised stock exchange.
◗◗ Ready-made companies may be bought.
◗◗ Community interest companies (CICs) may be created for the use of people who want 
to conduct a business or other activity for the benefit of a community and not purely for 
private advantage.
◗◗ There is a minimum capital requirement for public companies of £50,000.
1.2 A company must have a memorandum of association.
◗◗ The choice of the name of a company is important and subject to a number of 
restrictions. Incorporation is achieved after the memorandum and articles are delivered 
to the Registrar of Companies.
1.3 Companies can change from public to private status and vice versa.
1.4 A group of companies is a number of parent and subsidiary companies where the parent 
normally exercises control over the subsidiary. The relationship between parent and 
subsidiary raises a variety of delicate legal issues.
1.5 The doctrine of corporate personality means that the identity of the company stays the 
same, even if the identities of the managers or members (shareholders) of the business 
change.
1.1 What is the difference between the various types of companies?
1.2 What matters should be considered when choosing a name for a company?
1.3 What information is needed by the Registrar on the incorporation of a company?
1.4 When does a company come into existence?
Further reading
Sealy and Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law, 11th edn (Oxford University Press, 
2016).
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